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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EVE A. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WALTER THOMAS SMITH, 
Defendant and Rescondent. 
Case No. 20453 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
appellant herein elects to file the within reply brief. 
POINT I 
THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE RESONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD, NOR ARE HIS AUTHORITIES IN POINT 
Respondent's brief herein raises arguments that oatent-
ly conflict with the record; he cites authorities that are 
not in point; and he has failed to support his position with 
either logic or reason. For these reasons the appellant 
desires to briefly respond to the arguments raised by 
respondent. 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Undertake To Divide The 
Assets Of The Marriage In An Equitable Manner. Respondents 
sole point raised in his brief is that "The Trial Court 
Properly Executed the Mandate of This Court to Fairly and 
Equitably Divide the Property of the Parties". He properly 
cites the controlling statute (§30-3-5, Utah Code Annota-
ted) and then urges at page 11 of his brief that gift and 
contribution factors "were considered, weighed and relied 
upon by the trial court" in making the distribution of mari-
tal property. This statement from page 11 is simply not 
true. The trial judge did not weigh or consider anything, 
but concluded as a matter of law that he was bound to dis-
tribute property received by gift to the grantees as named 
in the written documents. The trial court based his deci-
sion strictly upon an erroneous application of the parol 
evidence rule (T-94). It is ludicrous and improper to argue 
that the trial court weighed any equitable considerations as 
mandated by §30-3-5 an by the decisions of this court inter-
preting said statute. 
2. Respondent's Authorities Are Not In Point. Respon-
dent has relied upon the cases of Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 
2d 166; 442 P.2d 928 (1968); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 
(Utah 1982); and Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978) 
for the proposition that property acquired by gift should be 
treated as marital property. 
In Weaver, the Court made an equal distribution of 
marital property, including property that the husband had 
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received by gift. The published ooinion of the court does 
not disclose the amount of the gifted property. It did dis-
close, however, a 33 year marriage; the raising of three 
children to majority; the fact that the wife had worked as a 
nurse during the husband's internship and during part of the 
marriage; the fact that the wife was totally disabled at the 
time of the divorce; and the fact that the property settle-
ment award was in lieu of any alimony. Under these circum-
stances, the court held that there was no abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the trial court in making an equal 
distribution of assets. 
In Bushel, the parties owned 131 acres of farmland in 
Marion, Utah, plus an additional 14 acres given by husband's 
father. The parties constructed a mobile home on one of the 
14 acres given by the husband's father. In the division of 
property, the wife was awarded the one acre parcel upon 
which the home was placed, together with temporary use of 
the other 13 acres to farm for the support of teenage minor 
children. On appeal, the Supreme Court commented that "con-
sidering that all but one acre of the real property and most 
of the farm equipment was awarded to the defendant, we do 
not find an abuse of discretion". 
Wilkins v. Stout, supra, merely involved the post 
divorce construction of a decree that was based upon a 
stipulation of the parties. Some dicta in the decision 
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states that under the equitable power of the court to pro-
vide for the welfare of children, in an appropriate case it 
may be appropriate for the court to take into account the 
fact that a party might be receiving a substantial inheri-
tance. Wilkins, however, does not even purport to deal with 
the issue of inheritance as marital or non-marital prop-
erty. 
None of the above authorities stand for the proposition 
for which they are cited. The cases, at best, involve 
unusual circumstances or other compelling considerations for 
an equitable adjustment. In the absence of such circum-
stances, the authorities commencing on page 10 of appel-
lant's main brief would compel the return of gifted prop-
erty. 
3. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply To This 
Case. The only authority cited by the respondent to support 
the trial court's application of the parol evidence rule are 
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) and Commercial 
Building Corporation v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776 (Utah 1977). 
Hartman v. Potter was a case dealing with the construction 
of minerals deed; the case generally recites that parol 
evidence is admissible where language of the written docu-
ment is ambiguous. Commercial Building Corporation v. 
Blair relates to a commercial lease and holds that parol 
evidence cannot be used to vary clear and plain meaning 
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of the written document. 
The instant case does not involve any attempt to vary 
the terms of a written document. Appellant merely claims, 
in accordance with abundant authority,1 that a divorce 
court may look beyond the state of the record title in 
determining whether assets were acquired by reason of the 
joint efforts of the parties. Ambuguity, or lack of ambu-
guity, in the instruments of conveyance are not necessarily 
even material. The repondent has cited no authority to the 
trial court, and has cited no authority to this court that 
the parol evidence rule has any application at all. 
4. Husband1s Alleged Contributions Into The Home Are 
Not A Proper Consideration On Appeal. Respondent at pages 
5, 6 and 7 of his brief makes a point of his alleged contri-
butions of $32,000.00 from his construction company that 
went into the construction of the home. Appellant strongly 
denied the existence of any such contributions. The trial 
court did not give the respondent credit for the alleged 
contributions and preferred to rest its finding upon what 
the court considered to be a normal use of funds by a 
married couple (T-ll; Finding of Fact No. 13)2. 
1
 See authorities in appellant's main Brief commencing at 
page 10. 
2
 The Findings were actually entered some 3-1/2 months 
after the trial. At the conclusion of the trial when the 
evidence was fresh the court also stated into the record 
that the evidence wholly failed to support defendant's claim 
(T-110). 
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Respondent's position as to this item is not entirely 
clear, but if he now contends that he should somehow be 
given a credit, his argument fails for two additional 
reasons. 
First, respondent has not filed a cross appeal in 
accordance with Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure3. 
Failure to file a cross appeal would prohibit consideration 
of this issue. Second, even if a cross appeal has been prop-
erty filed (which it was not), and even if the contributions 
had in fact been made (which were strongly denied), there is 
no evidence in the record whatsoever that the husband brought 
these assets into the marriage, or that the assets of the 
construction company were ever depleted below what existed at 
the time of the marriage. The burden of proof to establish a 
fact most always rests with the party who asserts the fact as 
being true. In Re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 
(1956). This burden has not been met. 
5. The Division of Wife's Retirement Account Is Not A 
Proper Consideration On Appeal. Respondent's claim at page 
15 of his brief that the wife's retirement account at the 
University of Utah should have been valued as of the date of 
divorce rather than the date of separation is likewise an 
3 See also Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 4(d) indica-
ting a change in Utah practice and requiring the filing of a 
cross-appeal. 
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indirect attempt to cross-appeal. No cross-appeal was filed 
under Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the 
raising of this issue is no longer timely. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's distribution of the assets of the 
marriage was based upon a misapplication of the parol evi-
dence rule. Property acquired by gift from the wife's 
parents was not marital property, and was not acquired 
through the joint efforts of the parties. There are no 
special circumstances in this case to justify a windfall dis-
tribution to the husband. The wife is entitled as a matter 
of lav/ to the return of the gifted property, together with 
the other assets that she brought into the marriage. 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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